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Organizational Innovation in the Multinational Enterprise: 
Internalization Theory and Business History  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This research note engages in a methodological experiment by using historical 
evidence to challenge a common misperception about internalization theory. 
The theory has often been criticized for maintaining that it assumes a 
hierarchically organized MNE based on knowledge flowing from the home 
country. This is not an accurate description of how global firms operate in 
recent decades, but this note shows it has never been true historically. Using 
longitudinal data on individual firms from the nineteenth century onwards, it 
reveals evidence of how entrepreneurs and firms with multinational activity 
faced by market imperfections changed the design of their headquarters and 
their organizational structures. 
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Organizational Innovation in the Multinational Enterprise: 
Internalization Theory and Business History  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Recently there have been multiple assertions that “history matters” in IB, although 
overcoming the methodological roadblocks to making it matter remains a work in 
progress (Jones and Khanna, 2006; Buckley 2009; Jones and Pitelis, 2015; Verbeke 
and Kano, 2015). This note offers a concrete example of the value of bridging the gap 
between IB theory and history which speaks directly to recent calls for addressing 
big questions and employing multidisciplinary perspectives (Buckley et al., 2017). It 
presents compelling new evidence about how entrepreneurs and firms with 
multinational activity faced by market imperfections in the nineteenth century 
changed the design of their headquarters roles and their organizational structures 
rather than changing their entry modes. This phenomenon is well-known in 
contemporary global business, and has erroneously been used to criticize 
internalization theory. The contribution of this note is to show that there is 
absolutely nothing new about this strategy.  
 
It is well-established that the multinational enterprise (MNE) as an organizational 
form has been around since the nineteenth century (Wilkins, 1970, 1974; Jones, 
2005a). Historical research on MNEs is often informed by the classic internalization 
theory proposed by Buckley and Casson (1976) to explain the emergence of the 
modern, internationally operating firm (for example Wilkins, 1998; Jones, 2000, 
2005a; Lopes, 2007, 2010; Verbeke and Kano, 2015; among others).  
 
One interesting element that arises, when looking at MNE historical trajectories, is 
the diversity of organizational forms employed across time. The past does not 
present us with what could be interpreted as a simplified version of today’s modern 
corporation. Instead the past reveals organizational forms that were (and are) novel, 
often complex, and uncommon. To use a biological analogy, it is not a single exotic 
animal that historians discover, but rather an entire zoo (Wilkins, 1988, 1998; Jones, 
1986; Dunning, 1993; Rugman and Verbeke, 1992; and Birkinshaw et al, 2006).  For 
the most part, the diversity of these firms has not been addressed explicitly by 
internationalization theory. Revisiting this past provides an important opportunity 
for the usefulness of theory to be tested in “new settings.” 
         
Historical research shows that the modern MNE emerged from a wide array of 
distinctly uncommon – and what appeared to be innovative – organizational forms. 
Three main types can be discerned. A first type were international enterprises which 
emerged without a domestic base, with companies either registered in the home 
country but with no local operations, or with local operations but no sales, or even 
without any home operations or sales. These included free-standing companies, a 
term seldom heard in the IB literature but which can be regarded as born global 
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companies ‘avant la lettre’, and companies created in host countries by expatriate 
entrepreneurs (Wilkins, 1988; Wilkins and Schröter, 1998; Jones, 2000; Lopes, 1997; 
Jones and Pitelis, 2015; Verbeke et al, 2014; Lopes et al, 2017). A second type of 
organizational form evolved out of collaborative arrangements, and was 
characterized by the absence of hierarchical relations between operations in 
different markets, and by limited equity stakes in foreign operations. This type has 
been described in the historical research on international cartels, some early forms 
of joint ventures, and so-called “cloaked” firms in Europe the interwar decades 
(Fear, 2008; Brown, 2000; Kobrak and Hansen, 2004; Kobrak and Wustenhagen, 
2006; Jones and Lubinski, 2012). A third type of organizational form was a network 
of independent firms linked by equity and non-equity connections. These were akin 
to today’s diversified business groups, but historically often originated from 
international trading companies.  In these cases, enterprises tended to have a 
domestic base, even if only in services (Carlos and Nicholas, 1988; Jones, 2000; Jones 
and Khanna, 2006). Interestingly, this organizational diversity has returned in the 
recent past.  
 
This research note addresses the following three issues. The first is to investigate the 
sources of the unconventional and innovative organizational forms of companies 
with multinational operations, drawing on historical evidence. The second is to 
propose an extension of internalization theory, taking into account the role of the 
entrepreneur in sourcing local knowledge in the host country, and the design of the 
headquarters, where the legal, financial and strategic roles of the MNE are supposed 
to be concentrated but whereby in some cases these roles became distributed 
across different markets. Rather than focussing on the familiar issue of the market-
hierarchy dichotomy, we show that firms did not necessarily change their entry 
mode when faced by market imperfections, but changed the design of their 
headquarters and the entrepreneurial type which acted as a vehicle to transfer or 
source knowledge. Third, the study examines the efficiency properties of the 
evolutionary paths chosen both in terms of who performed entrepreneurial roles 
and how headquarter roles were distributed. 
 
The paper is organized in five parts. Section two provides an overview of the 
fundamentals of classic internalization theory, highlighting its implicit assumptions. It 
also explains how our empirical evidence might encourage an extension of 
mainstream theory, by adding two new dimensions: the role of the entrepreneur in 
sourcing local knowledge, and the design of the headquarters. Two main types of 
entrepreneurs are identified as providing knowledge: the innovative entrepreneur 
(from the MNE home country) and the local entrepreneur in the host country. The 
three main functions of headquarters that are central to its organizational design 
include the legal, financial, and strategic roles. Section three examines how 
entrepreneurs, and in particular expatriate entrepreneurs, impact on internalization 
decisions by MNEs. This section also discusses the nature of the opportunities they 
exploit and the modes of operation they employ in host countries. Section four 
provides historical evidence on how and why headquarters functions have been 
geographically distributed. It identifies the importance of political risk management 
and the seeking of efficiencies associated with access to resources and more 
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favourable legal and fiscal environments as major motivations. Finally, the fifth 
section concludes and highlights how inductive historical research can help refine 
and extend current theories.  
 
2. Extending Internalization Theory  
 
Theoretical background  
 
Classic internalization theory, first developed by Buckley and Casson (1976), and 
extended by Rugman (1981, 2005), Hennart (1982, 1991, 1993), Cassion (1987, 
1990), Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2003, 2008); Buckley and Casson (2009), Verbeke 
(2003, 2009), Narula and Verbeke (2015), and Casson et al (2016), amongst others, 
analyses the boundaries of firms in terms of market imperfections. Internalization 
occurs when the benefits of using hierarchy are equal or lower to the costs of using 
the market. The theory was originally developed as a general analysis of the 
boundaries of firms. However, the impetus for its development was the need to 
explain the post-1945 growth of market–seeking U.S. MNEs in knowledge–intensive 
manufacturing industries in Europe. This was undertaken by large U.S. corporations 
with multidivisional (M-form) organizational structures. The M-Form type of 
organization which developed from the 1920s, allowed firms to pursue strategies of 
diversification with a view to achieve efficiencies (Chandler, 1962; Chandler et al, 
1997). As has been noted as far back as Casson (1985, 1986, 1987), the fact that the 
classic internalization theory originated in particular historical circumstances created 
certain assumptions, and hindered application to understanding how international 
firms operated in different political and economic contexts. 
 
Internalisation theory developed as an explanation of ‘conventional’ MNEs of the 
kind described above rather than as a theory of all MNEs. As a result, every time an 
‘unconventional MNE’ was discovered, there was a call for a new theory. This has 
been the case with both emerging market MNEs and born global firms (Wells, 1983; 
Oviatt and McDougall, 1994; Knight and Cavusgil, 1996; Madsen and Servais, 1997; 
Cavusgil and Knight, 2015; Verbeke and Kano, 2015). Internalisation theory, as 
originally articulated, focused very sharply on issues of ownership and control, with 
higher risk being associated with organizational forms that involve higher control. It 
was assumed that other theories would be developed to address other key 
managerial issues. For example, the operations of host country licensees, franchisees 
and subcontractors would be explained by theories of small-firm behaviour, while 
the location of headquarters would be explained by organisational theory. These 
theoretical developments did not occur however, and so an obvious response is to 
extend the scope of internalisation theory to address these issues.  
 
Rugman (1981) acknowledged the importance of entrepreneurial choices in the face 
of uncertainty and the impact of institutional variables, especially in the realm of 
distance among countries and regions. Rugman and Verbeke (1992, 2003) 
recognized a variety of strategic and managerial issues involved in internalization, 
focusing in particular on the management of the innovation processes. This is 
achieved by infusing a ‘dynamic capabilities’ like perspective, with an emphasis on 
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generating, exploiting and rejuvenating firm-specific advantages and matching this 
with country specific advantages of host countries (Verbeke and Kano, 2012). Here 
we link internalisation issues to host country entrepreneurs and the sourcing of 
knowledge and the design and location of headquarters. Historical evidence 
(summarised below) suggests that these can affect internalisation decisions. Local 
entrepreneurs can play an active role in explaining internalization decisions and in 
the sourcing of local knowledge. In addition, the host country licensees, 
subcontractors, franchisees and sales agents, all of who can act as entrepreneurs, 
are not always local, and subcontractors and sales agents can be as entrepreneurial 
as licensees and franchisees.  
 
In a similar vein, the classic internalization theory does not discuss the design of the 
headquarters. The theory expresses great confidence in the ability of the ‘modern 
corporation’, as described by Chandler, to internationalize without fundamentally 
changing its organisation or its operating methods (Chandler, 1962, 1977, 1990, 
1991; Williamson, 1981a; Chandler et al, 1987). International diversification is 
supposed to respect the same organizing principles as domestic product 
diversification. In particular, internalization theory understates the importance of 
risk management, including political, social, business, financial, and natural risks 
(Casson and Lopes, 2013). While IB theory recognises these risks, they assume only a 
marginal role in the internalization theory, and at most they affect the mode of entry 
into a particular market (Hill et al, 1990; Agarwal et al, 1992; Buckley and Casson, 
2009). Here we show that firms historically engaged in multinational activity do not 
automatically choose the entry mode that minimizes risk and maximizes control for 
the expected return. Instead, the number of internalization options becomes much 
wider, even within a single entry mode, when the impact of alternative designs of 
headquarters in the realm of internalization decisions is acknowledged, as well as 
the role of the entrepreneur in sourcing local knowledge.  
 
In classic internalization theory, the legal, financial and strategic activities of the 
headquarters are all assumed to co-located, i.e. located in the same place. The 
headquarters are considered to readily manage operations from a distance, and 
efficiently control subsidiaries that may be operating in a more hostile environment 
overseas. Strategic knowledge is assumed to be generated in the headquarters, and 
local (and often also strategic) knowledge is supplied by the subsidiary. 
Communication with foreign subsidiaries is considered to be fast and to be easily 
effected, either remotely or face-to-face. Distance is a critical concept that affects 
the transferability, recombination, and exploitation of firm specific advantages 
across borders. If any dimension of distance increases, so do the costs of doing 
business abroad, as well as the challenges of effectively deploying firm specific 
advantages in a host environment. Distance creates new bounded rationality 
challenges for managers who must understand drastically different host 
environments, as well as bounded rationality problems (Wilkins, 2004; Verbeke and 
Greidanus, 2009).  
 
All the assumptions from internalization theory have to be relaxed when using 
historical evidence on early MNEs. When internalization theory is stripped down to 
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core principles, it becomes clear that the unconventional and apparently innovative 
organizational forms of early MNEs were an efficient response to the organisational 
problems of their time. Business history research provides a somewhat unique and 
complex picture compared to the IB literature dealing with the contemporary MNE, 
in particular, with regards to the role of the entrepreneur and the sourcing of local 
knowledge, and also the role of the headquarters. In international business history 
there is research, which emphasises global strategy, and other research which 
focuses on just a few markets. Some firms such as Ford, Singer, Siemens, J. & P. 
Coats, Lever Brothers and Nestlé, as well as a multitude of trading companies and 
business groups, are present in multiple countries since early on in their activity 
(Wilkins, 1977, 1988, 2009, 2015; Wilkins and Hill, 1964/2011; Jones, 1988, 2005b, 
2014; Jones and Schröter, 1993; Godley, 2006; Kim, 1995; Kininmonth, 2006; Lopes, 
2010; Lopes and Casson, 2007, 2012, 2013). Other firms invested in just a few 
foreign countries, and many in just a single one. The individual host country can 
therefore occupy an important place in historical research. Other studies look at the 
importance of MNEs and their impact (either positive or negative) on national 
economic development (Jones, 1987; Bostock and Jones, 1994; Jones and Bostock, 
1996; Jones, 2013; Jones and Lluch, 2015; Barbero, 2015; Barbero and Lluch, 2015; 
Beatty, 2009; Piquet, 2004). 
 
Business historians have also been interested not only in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) but in the transfer of technology and culture (Beatty, 2003), and for this reason 
they were concerned just as much about arm’s length contractual arrangements 
such as licensing, franchising and subcontracting as they were about conventional 
FDI. Their research emphasises the important role of entrepreneurs, not only as 
managers of local subsidiaries, but as independent proprietors or as agents for 
foreign firms. The focus on host countries also means that business historians have 
been interested in local capabilities (Mason, 1992). Local entrepreneurship has long 
been seen as key to local economic development (Schumpeter, 1934; Knight, 1921; 
Kizner, 1973; Casson, 2003; Casson and Godley, 2005). Local entrepreneurs are very 
visible in historical business records. Limited liability joint stock companies were rare 
in the early and middle nineteenth century. The business partnership was still 
important, while the modern corporation was virtually unknown outside the railway 
industry. The role of the individual entrepreneur was therefore much more evident 
than it is today (Payne, 1974; Cottrell, 1979;Wilkins, 1988; 2009).  
 
Entrepreneurship patterns 
 
In the following sections we provide evidence on entrepreneurs operating in foreign 
markets and developing early forms of MNEs. It is possible to identify different types 
of entrepreneurs in terms of their involvement in multinational activity and also 
their type of career trajectories and background. The foreign firm would typically be 
founded by an innovative entrepreneur from the headquarters’ country, while the 
business partner in the host economy would be a local entrepreneur. The innovative 
entrepreneur typically supplied knowledge regarding technology and product design 
as described by Schumpeter (1934), whilst the local entrepreneur contributed local 
knowledge, including insider knowledge obtained through personal networks, 
 7 
analogous to the Kirznerian entrepreneur (Kirzner, 1973, 1997). Early firms with 
multinational activity combined these two types of knowledge to serve their foreign 
markets through knowledge transfer between headquarters and subsidiaries. Their 
function was similar to what can be observed in the modern MNE, but the context 
was different, and this led to different organizational forms. The innovative 
entrepreneur would register the firm in the headquarters country, issue shares, and 
create a board of directors to represent the shareholders. A reputable non-executive 
chairman, typically drawn from the social elite, would be appointed. The 
entrepreneur would be a major shareholder and often act as managing director, 
overseeing the internationalisation process. On retirement he would endeavour to 
appoint his own successor who would carry on the entrepreneurial role (Jones, 2000; 
Garcia-Ruiz and Toninelli, 2010; Becker et al, 2011). 
 
The local entrepreneurs could act in various capacities. They could own and control 
their own firm: a subcontractor would undertake local production while a franchisee 
would undertake local marketing. If both production and marketing were 
undertaken by the same local entrepreneur then the entrepreneur became, in 
effect, a licensee: they bought the right to produce and sell the product for a term of 
years at their own risk, subject to various restrictions on market area and pricing 
policy. As a subcontractor, a local firm could either add value to a product supplied 
to it by the foreign firm (‘labour only subcontracting’), or supply a product it had 
produced entirely by itself (though perhaps using a foreign design). Franchisees 
typically owned the product that they sold, and therefore bore significant market 
risk; on the other hand, a sales agent would be rewarded with a fee. A franchisee 
would normally be tied in to purchasing from a specific foreign firm, although he 
might be allowed to handle non-competing franchises too. Agents might also be 
allowed to handle non-competing products (Becker, 1998; Jones, 2000; Lubinski and 
Jones, 2012; Jones and Colpan, 2016). 
 
A local entrepreneur could act as the manager of a foreign subsidiary instead. In this 
role, he would exercise powers devolved from headquarters, and use his own 
judgement to implement the headquarters’ strategy. In the nineteenth century 
communication was sufficiently slow, and risks sufficiently great, that local managers 
needed considerable autonomy to deal with unexpected threats or crises. The local 
manager would receive a salary, but could be rewarded with bonuses or increments 
if he performed particularly well. Nevertheless, many successful managers chose to 
leave their foreign employer once they had learned enough to set up a business on 
their own, becoming either independent partners of their previous employer, or in 
some cases rivals to this employer. Local entrepreneurs were not restricted to serve 
only the local market: they could export too, either to the source country, or to a 
third country, or to both. Exports to the source country were typically internal to the 
firm; the foreign subsidiary acted as an ‘offshore’ producer for the parent. Exports to 
a third country could also be internal, being consigned to another subsidiary of the 
same parent, as with trading firms; more commonly, though, exports would be 
supplied to independent foreign customers. In the nineteenth century, therefore, 
host-country entrepreneurs enjoyed considerable autonomy, whether as 
independent owners or as salaried employees (Becker, 1998; Jones, 2000).  
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The nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a time of extensive 
international migration, especially from Europe to North America (Chiswick and 
Hatton, 2003). Migration is widely recognised as a selective process in which the 
young, healthy and most entrepreneurial from different social backgrounds are most 
likely to move (Hatton, 1998; Hatton and Williamson, 2002). Migration affected the 
supply of both innovative entrepreneurs from a home country and local 
entrepreneurs in host countries. The latter is the focus here. Migration is not 
necessarily a one-off process. Migrants may be itinerant, moving on to another 
country later, and perhaps eventually returning to their home country. Migrants 
intending to return may decide not to change their nationality, preferring to operate 
as aliens in the country where they work. Alien merchants are documented 
extensively in historical accounts (Jones, 2000; Chapman, 2003; McCabe et al, 2005; 
Casson and Casson, 2013). In colonies and dependencies, citizens of the colonial 
power often occupied a privileged position even though they were not native to the 
country. In India prior to independence, for example, Indian institutions often 
distinguished between British citizens, Europeans and other ‘whites’, Anglo-Indians 
of ‘mixed race’, and locals, with the natives being further classified according to 
religion, caste and ethnicity, such as Parsee or Marwari (Tomlinson, 1989). 
 
In many colonies the resident expatriate was a familiar figure, a citizen of a foreign 
country but a permanent resident of the host country. While some expatriates 
settled permanently, often marrying locally, others were only temporary resident 
expatriates, as they returned home eventually (Lopes et al, 2017). The resident 
expatriates were well-suited to function as local entrepreneurs. They were familiar 
with the culture of their home country, and often had relatives there. They were also 
familiar with the host country, especially if they had in-laws there. They were 
‘boundary spanners’, belonging to networks both at home and abroad. Some had a 
professional background and were affiliated with international associations too (e.g. 
consulting engineers). Another interesting group included the host-country locals 
from wealthy families who had been educated in the source country and returned to 
work at home. As alumni of elite educational institutions, they were ‘trusted’ (i.e., 
viewed as reliable) to manage foreign operations. Like resident expatriates, they did 
not only support foreign firms to operate locally, but also to help local firms obtain 
finance from the source country. Contacts with the source country in the financial 
sphere were particularly useful if they decided to set up their own local businesses 
financed from abroad (Oonk, 2007; Harlaftis and Minoglou, 2005; Jones, 2013; David 
and Westerhuis, 2014). 
 
Finally, it is necessary to consider the temporary resident expatriate, who came from 
the source country specifically to be a local entrepreneur for a limited time. For the 
independent businessman, this implied a ‘get rich quick’ mentality, while for the 
manager of a foreign subsidiary it might involve a career move, designed to gain 
promotion.  Young managers could be seconded for a short time from headquarters, 
and replaced by another secondee when they returned home. The relative benefits 
of locally-educated locals, foreign-educated locals, resident expatriates and 
secondees, it can be argued, depended mainly on the relative importance of the 
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general knowledge possessed by the foreign headquarters and the local knowledge 
required for successful host-country operations. If local knowledge was the 
paramount requirement, then a locally-educated local entrepreneur who was totally 
embedded in the local community would be the right person for the job. At the 
other extreme, if up-to date familiarity with headquarters thinking was paramount, 
then the secondee was preferable. Although a steady stream of ‘novice’ secondees 
could prove disruptive, their up-to-date knowledge of headquarters thinking might 
outweigh this concern. Positioned closer to the middle of this spectrum of 
capabilities are the foreign–educated locals and the resident and temporary resident 
expatriates. Foreign-educated locals were more prominent in government and 
universities than in business, and so it is expatriates that are the focus in this paper. 
Expatriates were a compromise solution, combining an appreciation of headquarters 
culture and local culture (Jones and Wadhwani, 2007; Cassis and Minoglou, 2005; 
Godley, 2001). 
  
Design of headquarters 
 
We also identified historical patterns in terms of the design of headquarters by 
entrepreneurs with multinational activity. Business historians have been arguing for 
a while that the source country occupies a rather peculiar case in the business 
history literature because the location of the headquarters is sometimes unclear 
(Wilkins, 1988; Corley, 1994, 1998; Casson, 1994; Hennart, 1994; Hennart and 
Reddy, 1997; Wilkins and Schröter, 1998; Jones, 2000). Three main roles can be 
discerned. The first is that a headquarters represents the registered address of the 
firm for legal and tax purposes. This address governs where corporate taxes are paid, 
and therefore what rates of tax apply. In the nineteenth century, however, there 
were no significant corporate taxes, and as a result, off-shore tax havens were not 
the issue they would later become. As the location of the legal headquarters decides 
the judicial system used for the settlement of commercial disputes, this was very 
relevant to ‘trader’ MNEs making contracts with foreign businesses (Jones, 2000). 
The legal headquarters also gave the firm a right to call upon the home country 
government for protection of its overseas interests. When operating in a risky or 
politically unstable overseas environment, it was useful to have a major world power 
on the MNE’s side: imperial capitals therefore attracted legal headquarters (Wilkins, 
1999; Cassis, 2006).  
 
Risk and political instability was important in other ways as well. When nations are at 
war, the legal headquarters may be moved to a safe haven, allowing the business to 
continue, even when the other headquarters functions are ‘located’ in an occupied 
country.  If political instability is widespread, and even neutral countries are under 
threat, then multiple headquarters may be used: different holding companies of 
different nationalities are established, ready to be activated if and when required. 
Although legal headquarters may, in a physical assets sense, represent little more 
than ‘brass name plates’, deposit boxes, or empty rooms, they can be highly 
significant as risk management tools (Wubs, 2008). They can also be used for 
criminal purposes:  for example, to disguise money transfers by drug traders and 
arms dealers (Austin et al, 2017).  
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The second role of headquarters is that it represents the place where strategic 
decisions are taken by an innovative entrepreneur, and where the firm’s board of 
directors convenes. In this context, ‘strategic’ means two things. First, that major 
investment decisions are being taken under uncertainty. These decisions are often 
irreversible, and resources, once committed to a project, cannot be easily recovered. 
A mining venture, for example, involves irreversible, fixed commitments to boring 
tunnels and building heavy transport infrastructure. If the project fails, a hole in the 
ground may be all that is left. On the other hand, the decision to build a new 
distribution centre may involve much less risk, because the warehouse and vehicles 
are versatile (or mobile) assets and can be easily sold off in the second-hand market 
if the project fails. 
 
Strategic also means that interactions with other players are involved. These may be 
competitors, alliance partners, or the firm’s own subsidiaries. The headquarters 
needs to monitor these players, predict their behaviour and plan responses to it, and 
where appropriate, negotiate with them. A headquarters that performs a strategic 
role requires access to highly skilled managers, supported by a range of specialised 
professionals. It may also benefit from being located close to the headquarters of its 
major partners and rivals, as well as its own subsidiaries, in order to have access to 
the best possible information (Marshall, 1920; Porter, 1998; Zeitlin, 2008).   
 
Large-scale investments require finance, and this identifies the third role of 
headquarters. Three different forms of finance are normally involved: equity (the 
riskiest), long-term fixed interest debt (the second riskiest) and short-term lending 
secured on versatile collateral assets (the most secure form of debt from the 
lender’s point of view). Procuring finance requires access to wealthy individuals and 
large financial institutions (notably banks). A stock exchange is required to provide 
liquidity to long-term investors. Financial backers making significant investments 
require regular face-to-face briefings. Thus the financial headquarters needs to be 
based in a major financial centre. There are a limited number of such centres from 
which to choose, which explains why so many large enterprises have financial 
headquarters in the same few locations (Wilkins, 1999; Cassis, 2006).     
 
These three headquarters roles – legal, strategic and financial - are the most crucial. 
But it is worth noting another, namely the location of major research laboratories or 
other core management functions. While the research laboratory did not become a 
significant factor until the end of the nineteenth century, with the commercialisation 
of electricity, it is mentioned here for the sake of completeness. It has been 
suggested that the central laboratory needs to be co-located in the same country 
(even if not in the same site) as the headquarters, although with which type of 
headquarters is unclear (Dunning, 1998, 2009; Blanc and Sierra, 1999; Crisculo et al, 
2005). It seems unlikely to be the legal headquarters, although co-location could be 
relevant if patents and other intellectual property are under threat. Co-location with 
shareholders also seems unlikely, because ordinary shareholders are unlikely to 
understand what is going inside in the laboratory, and it could undermine 
commercial secrecy if they did.  The obvious candidate for co-location is the strategic 
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headquarters, to allow the strategy of the firm to be aligned with new technologies 
and products emerging from the laboratory. Evidence suggests, however, that the 
strongest pull to attract laboratory locations comes from knowledge hubs, where 
pools of specialist researchers reside and university facilities are available to support 
research (Porter, 2000; Kristensen and Zeitlin, 2004; Benito, et al, 2009; Narula and 
Santangelo, 2012).   
 
Focusing on the three main roles identified above, the question is whether these 
roles should all be co-located in a unitary headquarters. Classic expositions of 
internalization theory implicitly assume that they should (Buckley and Casson, 1976; 
Dunning and McQueen, 1981). The assumption is made by default, however, in the 
sense that the question is not really asked. Business history, on the other hand, 
clearly shows that it needs to be asked. Distributed headquarters, where different 
roles are carried out in different countries were very common in the nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century. There are two main reasons why headquarters 
roles could be distributed. One is specialisation of location according to comparative 
advantage, and the other is the management of risk. Comparative advantage implies 
that different headquarters roles require different sorts of inputs, and that different 
inputs are cheapest at different locations. Headquarters roles also require skilled 
professional workers and a sound institutional environment, whereby input costs are 
less important. Favourable access to legal skills could detach the legal headquarters 
from the others, and access to banking and financial institutions could do the same 
for financial headquarters (Wilkins, 1988).  
Strategic decision taking could be detached in order to facilitate or accelerate flows 
of information and goods, in particular when communications were not fast. Risk 
management has been a very common cause of separation of headquarters roles.     
Co-location of headquarters’ roles because of risk management, tends to be 
associated with cases of unfavourable tax regimes, war, expropriation, 
discrimination, and excessive or lack of regulation (Rugman, 1976; Morck and Yeung, 
1991; Boddewyn and Brewer, 1994; Jensen, 2008). In the first case, it will be located 
in a tax haven, and in the other cases in a politically stable, well-regulated country. 
Since countries often become tax havens to compensate for other disadvantages 
(they are often small countries), a tax haven is unlikely to attract other roles. Hence, 
firms that relocate their legal headquarters for tax reasons, will usually have this 
legal headquarters separated from the strategic and financial headquarters – these 
other roles will not follow the legal headquarters to the same location. There are 
good grounds for co-locating the strategic and financial roles. Strategists will find it 
useful to sound out financiers on the prospects of funding major new investments. 
Bankers, entrepreneurs and wealthy investors constitute a social elite that will tend 
to have shared tastes, based around cultural and social activities, and value 
international logistics connectivity. They will therefore prefer to reside in the same 
sorts cosmopolitan locations. The main reason for pulling them apart is that the 
strategists may need to co-locate with operations, and operations may be based in 
an ‘industrial heartland’ elsewhere (Wilkins, 1988).  
Finally, it should be noted that headquarters’ roles can sometimes be replicated in 
different locations. A focus on risk management would suggest that in times of war, 
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the legal headquarters could be replicated among several locations. If there are two 
belligerent countries, and a neutral country, which might also be invaded, then it 
could pay a vulnerable MNE to have headquarters in each, so that irrespective of 
whom won the war, the firm would command headquarters in the ‘winning’ country, 
whether or not the neutral country were invaded (Wubs, 2008). Financial 
headquarters can also be replicated, but for different reasons. If two large firms 
merge to create an even larger firm, the new firm may acquire two large pools of 
shareholders in different financial centres. To keep the loyalty of both groups, it may 
decide to retain a presence in both countries by maintaining a headquarters office 
there (Wilson, 1954, 1968; Jones, 2005b; Jonker and van Zanden, 2007). Note that 
while different legal locations are normally alternatives to each other, different 
financial headquarters may be complements instead. In certain circumstances, 
however, legal headquarters could be complementary too, e.g., if the MNE has 
foreign investments in two different empires, or spheres of political influence, it 
might maximise its political leverage by headquartering different holding companies 
in each imperial capital (Jones, 1981, 2005).  
 
Proposed extension  
 
IB theory has dealt with these topics separately.  On the one hand, it has discussed 
the role of the entrepreneur in the sourcing of knowledge and the accessing of 
complementary assets (Richardson 1972; Rugman, 1981; Teece, 1986; Verbeke et al, 
2014; Verbeke and Kano, 2015). On the other hand, it has studied the design and 
functions of the headquarters (Hedlund, 1986, 1994; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 
Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Young and Goold, 1999; Sölvell and Zander, 1995; Foss, 
1997; Collis et al, 2007; Andersson and, 2010; Hilleman and Verbeke, 2014; Kunisch 
et al, 2015; Coeurderoy and Verbeke, 2016; Meyer and Benito, 2016). The historical 
evidence presented here challenges us to assess whether analysis of entrepreneurial 
roles and headquarters role distribution can be combined with internalization theory 
to explain unconventional or innovative organizational forms of MNEs. Figure I 
illustrates such approach.  
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Figure 1 – Proposing an Extension of Internalization Theory 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
There are three dimensions, each one represented in a separate axis. On the first 
dimension, the innovative entrepreneur chooses the location and internalization 
strategy of the corporation, which ranges from markets to hierarchies, and includes 
other hybrid modes such as subcontracting, franchising, and licensing. The second 
dimension relates to the type of entrepreneur chosen for sourcing of local 
knowledge in the host country. It can be a local entrepreneur, an expatriate 
entrepreneur or a secondee sent from the home country. The type of expatriate 
could include an alien migrant, permanent resident expatriate or a temporary 
resident expatriate, among other options. On a third dimension, the innovative 
entrepreneur chooses the design of the headquarters, which can range from co-
locating all the headquarters functions (legal, financial and strategic) in one country, 
to distributing these across distinct markets.  Other options exist in between these 
two extremes. For example, the legal and financial functions could be concentrated 
in one country, with only the strategic function distributed. The historical evidence 
collected to develop this proposed extension of internalization theory is provided 
below, in sections 3 and 4. 
 
It is possible to find patterns and interdependencies between internalization 
strategies, the innovative organizational forms chosen by firms, and also the 
geographical distribution of headquarters roles. Firms that rely on expatriate 
entrepreneurs tend to have both the advantages of knowledge transfer and sourcing 
of local knowledge, with the inherent limitations associated with bounded rationality 
(Williamson, 1975; 1981a, 1981b, 1996). Firms operating in distant and less 
developed markets, looking to funding their activities, tend to create headquarters 
with financial detachment so that they can access more advanced and efficient 
capital markets. Firms striving to survive in markets characterized by high risks, tend 
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to choose legal detachment. These risks can be varied, and include legal (eg. 
taxation), political (eg. war) and economic and business (eg. lack of protection of 
intellectual property rights). The strategic detachment of headquarters tends to 
occur when it is not possible to manage operations from the legal headquarters 
because of difficulty of communications, especially the time to take strategic 
decisions in very short periods of time. It is also possible to identify ‘clusters’ of 
behaviour of MNES, where they share similar preferences with regards their 
decisions to internalize, choose entrepreneurs to manage their business in the host 
country and design the headquarters. Co-located MNEs are more likely to 
internationalize and create subsidiaries in foreign markets, either by sending 
secondees, or hiring local managers. Firms operating in high-risk environments are 
more likely to detach the legal headquarters. Firms investing in very different 
cultural and institutional environments, with a strong need to take decisions and 
adapt their strategies and operations to local environments are more likely to detach 
their strategic activities and use expatriate entrepreneurs to manage their 
businesses (Gálvez-Muñoz and Jones, 2001).  
 
 
3. The Entrepreneur in the host country 
 
Expatriate entrepreneurs are well-equipped by life experience to manage effectively 
in culturally diverse settings, and to network internationally (Lopes et al, 2017). In 
the nineteenth century many entrepreneurs were attracted to high-risk 
environments, such as the American frontier, gold rushes, and diamond rushes. Their 
lifestyle often involved significant mobility between employments as well as 
between countries (McCraw, 1995; Casson and Casson, 2013).  Some expatriates 
such as Andrew Carnegie who immigrated from Scotland to the US in 1848, did not 
have any technical training (Livesay, 1975; Chandler, 1977). Others, were educated, 
with a professional background by the time they started their new businesses in 
foreign countries. Hans Wilsdorf, the creator of the famous (and eventually Swiss) 
watch Rolex, was born in Germany and moved to Geneva after loosing his parents 
and finishing high school. First he worked for a pearl trading company, and then for a 
watch exporter Cuno Korten. When he was 22, Wilsdorf moved to London first to 
work for a watch making company; and set up his own watch making business in 
1908.  During World War I he moved his business to Switzerland due to watime tax 
increases in Britain in levied on luxury imports. In 1920 he acquired Aegler, his 
wristwatch movements supplier in Switzerland, and moved the headquarters of the 
firm to Bienne (Jones and Atzgerger, 2015; Jones and Pitelis, 2015). All the previous 
experience gave Wilsdorf the technical skills to manage more risky projects and the 
social confidence and networks to raise funds to finance them.  
 
Notwithstanding this, in countries with large expatriate communities they could be 
cliquish; trust between expatriates was often mediated by peer-group monitoring 
through membership of ‘the club’. In some countries, in particular colonies or 
developing countries, the membership of elite clubs provided entrepreneurs with 
the possibility to network informally and also discuss business. But it was also 
common for entrepreneurs to create linkages between each other through 
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interlocking directorships in their respective organizations (Ridings, 1985; Cage, 
1985; Cassis, 1992; Landes et al, 2010; David and Westerhuis, 2014).   
 
As highlighted in Figure 1 above, host country expatriates could engage in 
international operations in three main ways. First, they could act as subsidiary 
managers. Such managers were often recruited from extended families, networks of 
friends, or through the wider expatriate community in the host country (Wilkins, 
1988; Jones, 1986, 2000, 2005). Second, they could operate as subcontractors, 
franchisees, licensees or agents. In some cases they acted as local representatives of 
trading companies, which were conspicuous in exports of commodities. In other 
cases they handled the sale of patented machinery or branded consumer products. 
They were not always reliable partners, however. They could copy and improve 
technologies used under licence, imitate or counterfeit franchised brands, and 
infringe agreements by exporting outside their designated market areas. While they 
were often selected as business partners because they were believed to be more 
‘trustworthy’ than fully local people, this advantage was relative rather than 
absolute (Wilkins, 1988). 
 
Third, expatriates could set up their firms, either by going solo or in partnership with 
others. In some cases they would travel back to their home country to raise finance 
before returning to the host country to invest in the business.  Quite large 
businesses could be established in this way, including mines, ranches, commercial 
forests and even the railways that conveyed commodity exports to the nearest port. 
Expatriates also contributed to building urban infrastructure, including roads, 
utilities, and large-scale housing developments. Many of the larger companies 
established in this way were ‘free-standing’; they were legally headquartered in, and 
financed from, the expatriate’s home country, as described in section 4. Strategy 
was often devolved to the host country, especially before circa 1890. They typically 
followed a pattern where legal and financial headquarters were in the 
entrepreneur’s home country and strategic headquarters in the host country 
(Hennart, 1986; Wilkins, 1988; Wilkins and Schröter, 1998; Cassis, 1992; Jones, 1993, 
1998, 2000; Lopes and Simões, 2017). 
 
Table 1 identifies four different types of activities that commonly appear carried out 
by expatriate entrepreneurs in IB history. Each type of activity combines specific 
economic functions associated with different market opportunities. The types of 
activities are indicated in the columns and the opportunities identified by the 
expatriate entrepreneur in the rows. Each type of activity is discussed in turn.  The 
crosses identify the cases where evidence was found, i.e. market opportunities that 
led expatriate entrepreneurs to be involved in specific types of activities in foreign 
markets. 
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Table 1 - A typology of roles commonly performed by expatriate entrepreneurs in the host country 
 
Activity 
 
 
Opportunity 
 
Import/export 
merchant 
Subcontractor/ 
associate producer 
for foreign firm 
 
Franchisee of foreign 
firm 
 
Licensee of foreign 
firm 
Local market recognition for 
local production or import 
x  x x 
Local production site 
recognition for local 
consumption or export  
x x  x 
Local adaptation of foreign 
technology  
 x  x 
Local adaptation of foreign 
brand 
  x x 
Access to foreign risk capital  x x x 
Access to local risk capital x x x x 
Source: Authors 
 
The activity of the import/export merchant (column 1) is associated with the 
identification by the entrepreneur of local market opportunities for local production, 
for import, for local consumption or for export, and is often associated with access 
to local risk capital. An example is Joseph Nathan, a Londoner who settled in 
Wellington, New Zealand in 1857 and established the firm Joseph Nathan & Co. He 
began by importing groceries, ironmongery, from Great Britain. The fact that New 
Zealand was part of the British Empire facilitated the trade of goods between the 
two markets, with almost no barriers to entry. In the 1890s, with the development of 
both refrigerated ships and New Zealand farmers’ selling cooperatives, he began 
exporting frozen meat and butter to Britain. His business prospered, and by the 
1930s the company, which had by them expanded into dried milk, detected an 
unexploited opportunity in nutritional foods, this marking the beginning of 
diversification into pharmaceuticals with the production of vitamins. This company 
developed into Glaxo, a major manufacturer of pharmaceuticals, which 
subsequently, in 2000, merged with Smith Kline Beecham to form pne of the largest 
pharmaceutical companies in the world - MNE GSK (Davenport-Hines, 1986; 
Davenport-Hines and Slinn, 1992). 
 
An illustration of the case of associate producer (in column 2 in Table 1) is the firm 
Sandeman & Co. set up in Porto, Portugal in 1814 by George Sandeman. George 
Sandeman was a partner of a British firm Sademan Gooden & Foster, set up in 1790 
dedicated to the import and export of wines, as well as British linens, cotton goods 
and other manufactured products. The business sold port wines, among other 
alcoholic beverages, the firm had exclusive rights to the distribution and sale for the 
port wine Campion, Offley and Hesketh & Co, Warre & Co., and also Thomas da 
Rocha Pinto in the British market, based in Portugal. Even though intermediation 
commissions were good, Sandeman considered that the considerable margins 
obtained by wine producers were very attractive. That knowledge, and also the 
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development of new networks with farmers and other wine producers over the 
years, and also the increase in demand for port in the UK as the result of the 
Napoleonic Wars which stop imports from France, created opportunities for new 
port businesses to develop. In 1814 George Sandeman decided to set up his own 
port wine firm in Porto, independent of his London partners. The company was 
registered in Portugal and was completely independent from the UK business. This 
led to a sharp decline in business for the port firms Sandeman used to act as an 
agent for in the UK. To develop the business George Sandeman sent his nephew 
George Glas Sandeman to manage the newly established firm. From then onwards 
the British firm Sandeman, Gooden & Foster (SGF) essentially purchased, blended, 
aged and sold port wine which was supplied by Sandeman & Co. While acting at the 
main distribution channel in the UK, SGF was also central in the financing the 
Portuguese firm through loans (Halley, 1990; Duguid and Lopes, 1999).  
 
A notable example of franchising (column 3 in Table 1) is the sewing machine 
company Singer, usually considered to be the first firm to use such mode of entry in 
different markets. In the US, Singer used a network of licensed engineers across the 
country, who would carry stocks of the most common components and repair the 
machines locally. The engineers were all self employed and paid directly by the 
customer, but could call themselves ‘official licensed repairers’. The engineers would 
buy component stock from Singer and also pay Singer a small percentage of the 
invoice price as a fee for being allowed to operate as authorized repairers. The 
business developed to the point where repair engineers also sold replacement 
machines. In foreign markets, Singer used franchising to enter markets that were not 
considered to be strategic. For instance, in 1872, Singer established a contract with 
Bassett & Company to develop secondary markets. Bassett handled Singer machines 
in Chile and Peru and appointed sub-agents in other South American countries. The 
contract required it to maintain ‘suitable stores’ in Valparaiso and Lima ‘ for the 
exclusive exhibition and sale’ of singer sewing machines, ‘to appoint and maintain 
agencies’ throughout Chile and Peru, to maintain an inventory adequate to serve the 
trade, to extend the usual terms of create and to set retail prices approved by the 
Singer company. Bassett had, however, to rely on its own resources to finance the 
marketing effort. These franchising agreements provided a mode of entry with 
limited risk into these markets and simultaneously formed the learning platform for 
subsequent foreign direct investment from 1883, when Frederick Bourne became 
president of the firm and exclusive sales organizations were established in the 
regions where the company had already expanded (Davies, 1969, 1976; Carstensen, 
1984; Cruz-Fernández, 2014).  
Licensing agreements (column 4 in Figure 1) generally require partners with more 
technical expertise than merchants or franchisees because they need to absorb 
technology in order to produce the product that they sell. An illustration is the 
contract set up by the Berliner Company from the US with Trevor Williams, a British 
solicitor, to act as exclusive sales agent and licensee in the import of records from 
the US, and also to produce them. To develop this business Trevor Williams set up 
the Gramophone Company 1898. In 1899 the company purchased the rights from 
Eldridge Johnson, a New Jersey engineer who had developed a spring motor that 
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operated recordings quietly at a uniform speed, to manufacture sound recordings. In 
1901, Johnson agreed with the British licensee that they were guaranteed at least 50 
percent of Johnson’s present and future capacity. The world’s markets were divided. 
The Gramophone Company was to sell in Europe, the British Empire, Russia and 
Japan, and Johnson everywhere else. Although the company was of British origin, 
with capital raised in Britain, its technology and senior management were American 
The rationale for the choice of licensing agreements as opposed to other modes of 
entry was the desire to jump tariffs, the nature of the product and the market, 
enabling, for example, the firm to reduce the delays in bringing out new lists of 
locally recorded music; and transport costs (Jones, 1985).  
Expatriates were not, of course, the only people managing international operations 
in host countries. The policy of seconding headquarters staff to manage overseas 
subsidiaries became common in the early twentieth-century. The British cotton 
thread MNE J. & P. Coats was pioneering in the industry and one of the biggest MNEs 
before 1914, traditionally relied on agents to sell in foreign markets. From 1889, 
after the appointment of a new foreign sales manager Otto Ernst Philippi, the 
company changed its market entry strategy in foreign markets by creating ‘The 
Central Agency’ which aimed to control all the sales in foreign markets, except the 
US where alternative arrangements were in place. J. & P. Coats organization 
structure in international markets became very complex, with a large number of 
foreign subsidiaries with various degrees of ownership. Entry in foreign markets was 
essentially through mergers and acquisitions. That mode of entry was the most 
efficient in a market characterized by increased tariffs and increased competition. 
The combination of these factors meant that it was more effective to produce locally 
than to export (Wilkins, 1989; Kim, 1995, 1997; Kininmonth, 2006). Throughout the 
twentieth century professional management and the assignment of managers to 
overseas posts was to become the hallmark of US FDI. The secondment of staff to 
subsidiaries replaced reliance on resident expatriates. In most cases, seconding staff 
to foreign markets proved to be effective. They had the knowledge of how to 
manage the company (Wilkins and Hill, 1964/2011; Wilkins, 1970, 1974, 1989, 2004). 
 
4. The Design of Headquarters 
 
We presented case study evidence that was used to identify patterns of design 
headquarters and to propose an extension to the internalization theory in section 2. 
Table 2 suggests the typology of headquarters designs based on the level of 
centralization versus geographic distribution of the different headquarters functions 
- legal, financial and strategic. The letters (A, B, C) identify the country where the 
headquarters is located (A represents a first source country, typically – though not 
necessarily – the home country; B represents another country; and C represents a 
third country). There are five logical possibilities that need to be considered for 
headquarters’ design strategies. Each involves a different pattern of location. The 
first is conventional co-location, shown as ‘Pattern 1’, where all roles are located in 
the same place. The next three columns indicate different forms of separation of 
headquarters roles: legal detachment, where the legal headquarters is moved to 
country B, financial detachment, and strategic detachment. The final column 
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indicates a fully distributed headquarters where each role is performed in a different 
location from the other ones.  
 
Table 2. Five patterns of Headquarters Design Strategy 
 
 Location strategy 
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5 
Headquarters 
role 
Co-location Legal 
detachment 
Financial 
detachment 
Strategic 
detachment 
Distributed 
Legal A B A A A 
Financial A A B A B 
Strategic A A A B C 
Source: Authors 
Note: A, B, C – different countries for headquarters roles 
 
The conventional arrangement (Pattern 1 in Table 2) is the one typically assumed for 
a MNE. An illustration of legal detachment (Pattern 2 in Table 2) is the Swiss MNE 
Nestlé just before World War II. In response to mounting international tensions, the 
company decided to restructure as a precaution. This restructuring stripped the 
headquarters of direct management of most of its established markets. Two legal 
headquarters were created with the aim of securing the survival of the company’s 
business in the Americas should a war brake out and Switzerland either entered it or 
was overrun. The parent company was transformed into a holding company – Anglo-
Swiss Holding Company and remained based in Switzerland, the same country as the 
financial headquarters. Nonetheless, a second holding company – Unilac, was 
created by a number of Nestlé overseas associates. Unilac’s legal headquarters were 
in the Republic of Panama, where Nestlé had been present for many years, and 
remained so until 1985. When World War II became imminent it was decided that 
the top senior executives of Nestle would be split. The Chairman, Edouard Mullet, 
the Chairman, moved to Stamford, Connecticut, and devoted himself to run the 
overseas side of the business including North, Central and South America, and 
Britain (and Britain controlled the activities in Asia, including Japan). It was becoming 
easier to supervise some of the distant markets from the US than from Switzerland. 
This move switched the firm from pattern 2 to pattern 5 in Table 2, where all the 
headquarters role appear disintegrated. The Vice-Chairman, Carl J. Abegg, and the 
Managing Director, Maurice Paternot, remained in Switzerland and dealt with the 
continental European markets. These moves, which divided the company’s interests 
into two groups, each falling into the logical sphere of influence of one or other two 
jointly-owned holding companies, greatly simplified that task of management under 
exceptional war conditions (Heer, 1966, 1991; Kurosawa, 2010; Donzé and 
Kurosawa, 2013). 
 
Another example of legal detachment (pattern 2 in Table 2) is the case of the 
German pharmaceutical company Beiersdorf. In order to limit the risk of 
expropriation should another war break out, in 1934 it created an international ‘ring 
structure’. This structure placed the subsidiary in Amsterdam in the middle of a ring 
of foreign affiliates. As a result of this re-organization the core company in 
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Amsterdam (which had been until then a subsidiary of Beiersdorf in Germany) 
became responsible for purchasing the most important raw materials and ensuring 
quality control, for jointly-organizing research, advertising and general 
administration. This central organization was financed by an annual fee to be paid by 
the other ring firms. In most countries, such as Switzerland, France, and the US, 
Beiersdorf’s affiliates held only the trademarks and sometimes plants and 
equipment, whereas the actual business was done by independent partner 
companies. The profit was divided evenly between the Beiersdorf affiliates and the 
partner firms in the respective markets. The parent company in Germany received a 
license fee based on turnover. The contact to Beiersdorf Germany was limited to the 
fee and the purchase of those raw materials and products that could not be 
manufactured abroad. As a consequence, Beiersdorf was henceforth composed of 
two legally separated pillars, the German business and the foreign business (Jones 
and Lubinski, 2012).  
 
An example of financial detachment (Pattern 3 in Table 2) is Jardine Matheson, 
which was first established in 1832, in Canton (now Guangzhou) by two British 
expatriate entrepreneurs, and was known for its leading role in the opium trade, as 
well as trading tea and cotton. This firm was established in the first place to take 
advantage of the opportunities created by the end of the monopoly of the British 
East India Company on trade between Britain and China. While the main 
shareholders were based in the UK where it was easier and more effective to fund 
new investments, and also where they recruited their staff and sold their tea, the 
legal headquarters and strategic headquarters were both located in China. William 
Jardine, a British citizen, moved to Canton, where he lived as an expatriate 
entrepreneur until he retired in the UK in 1837. In 1841, he was elected a Member of 
Parliament. James Matheson also returned to the UK in the early 1840s, and also 
became a Member of Parliament, among other duties that he took upon his return 
such as serving as chairman of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation 
Company. In 1842 the legal headquarters moved to Hong Kong, which has been 
ceded to Britain as a result of the First Opium War and the Treaty of Nanking. The 
Jardine Matheson group still exists today as a diversified business group with 
businesses spreading from retail, to real estate, financial services, shipping and 
aviation, and hotels, among others. In 1984, following the agreement of the British 
government of Margaret Thatcher to transfer sovereignty of Hong Kong to China in 
1997, the legal headquarters were moved to Bermuda, with the main shareholders 
remaining in Hong Kong, and the top management based in the United Kingdom.  
Jardine & Matheson had its business in China expropriated in 1947, so this move 
aimed to prevent any possible risks that might arise once Hong Kong became part of 
China. The move of the legal headquarters was followed by a move of the financial 
headquarters with the primary stock exchange moving to London in 1994. 
Nonetheless Singapore becoming the primary trading market. The more recent 
changes in the location and functions of headquarters positions the firm today as 
reflecting pattern 5 in Table 2: the location of the legal headquarters is different 
from that of the financial headquarters and both are distinct from the location of the 
strategic headquarters (Jones, 2000; The Economist, 2015).  
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Another illustration of pattern 3 in Table 2 is the Precious Metals Corporation set up 
in South Africa in 1949 by the American entrepreneur Charles Engelhard Jr. While 
the main shareholders, such as Robert Fleming & Co, a London merchant bank, were 
based in the US and Great Britain, the legal headquarters and top management were 
based in South Africa. This investment resulted from an opportunity, identified by 
Engelhard when travelling in South Africa, to manufacture gold products for sale in 
the Far East where people prefer gold to paper money (Bedingfield, 1963; Jones and 
Benton, 2016). The main rationale for the choice of such design of headquarters very 
similar to that of Jardine’s over a century earlier, related to the ability to source the 
investment more sophisticated capital market. 
 
Strategic detachment (Pattern 4 in Table 2) is illustrated by the free-standing firm, a 
type of firm identified by Wilkins (1988) which was ‘the most typical; mode of British 
direct investment before 1914’. Other countries, also developed free-standing 
companies but their contribution to world trade and investment during the same 
period was much less significant (Corley 1994; Wilkins and Schröter, 1998). These 
firms did not grow out of the domestic operations of existing enterprises as US MNEs  
did for the same period. In most cases they were set up by expatriate entrepreneurs 
who, aimed to tap into the British capital market, and established legal headquarters 
in the home country, but conducted all their activities in the host countries that 
offered attractive opportunities. This type of firms gave the borrowers privileged 
access to capital and protected the firms by British law, while tapping into overseas 
opportunities. The home country offices normally comprised a corporate secretary 
and the board of directors, and little else. This type of firms was particularly 
important in industries such as transport infrastructure, utilities, primary-sector; and 
urban development (hotels, offices, housing and so on). Several efficiency arguments 
have been provided ranging from the internalization of capital (Hennart, 1994) as 
borrowers had privileged access to capital. It also provided them with the ability to 
internalize competitive advantages associated with the market for project 
management skills (Casson, 1994), as manufacturing investments did not tend to 
take this form.  An illustration is the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, set up in the United 
Kingdom in 1908. The venture had originated as an endeavour to find oil in Iran on 
the basis of a wide-ranging concession granted to William Know D’Arcy, an 
Australian mining entrepreneur. The venture had been struggling, and only survived 
after the British government – anxious to achieve a supply of oil – persuaded an 
existing company, Burmah Oil, to invest equity. In 1909, following the discovery of 
oil, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was founded as a free-standing company. The 
Legal headquarters, as well as the board of directors were in London. But all the 
strategic decision taking and operations were based in Iran. It remained in this 
structure until 1914, when the British government took a majority shareholding, and 
subsequently transferred expropriated German owned distribution and transport 
companies in Britain to Angle-Persian (Jones, 1981; Corley, 1983; Ferrier, 1982). 
 
Another example of pattern 4 in Table 2 was Adidas, the manufacturer of sportwear. 
This family firm was established in 1920 for the production of sports shoes. In 1959, 
the son of the owner, Horst Dassler, was sent to Landersheim in France to create an 
Adidas subsidiary. After the death of his father Adolf Dassler, Horst Dassler became 
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the top manager of Adidas but chose to stay mainly in France, rather than return to 
Germany where the headquarters were incorporated. Managing the company from 
France allowed Horst Dassler to strengthen the company’s position in that market. 
Among other strategic initiatives, he bought Arena and Le Coq Sportif during the 
1970s, which he kept off the Adidas books. Throughout his life he managed Adidas 
operations worldwide from France, even though its legal and financial headquarters, 
were in Germany. While there was a governance efficiency rationale was associated 
with the need for the CEO of the company to be near the market where the 
company was aiming to invest at the time, the main reason was to separate the 
strategic decision taking from the majority control and opinion by the family, a 
reflection of the dysfunctional nature of the Dassler family (Jones, et al. 2016; 
Simson and Jennings, 1992: 24-25). 
 
The case of distributed headquarters (pattern 5 in Table 2) is illustrated by 
Companhia Real dos Caminhos de Ferro Portugueses, established in Portugal in 1859. 
It is the result of foreign investment in Portugal by a group of investors from France, 
Spain and Portugal. French institutions had the majority of the shares and control of 
decision taking. Even though the bylaws envisaged that the board of directors in 
Portugal should be the only official top management body, in practice the 
‘delegation in Paris’ had the actual role of managing the business. The Paris 
Committee was comprised of a large number of top managers, which included a 
chairman of the board in Paris, one executive director, an engineering consultant, 
and various members of staff involved in financial and cost accounting, equity and 
debt management. The Paris Committee approved all new contracts, issued new 
bonds, established new business alliances and provided loans to other companies, 
hired new engineering consultants and executives, and purchased new rolling stock 
and material, without consulting the board in Lisbon. In contrast, the formal board in 
Lisbon had a smaller staff and merely operational and administrative duties. Thus, 
while the legal headquarters were in Portugal, the strategy was set up in France, and 
some of the major shareholders were in Spain. This form of governance remained in 
place until 1884 when, as a result of negotiations with the Portuguese government 
for a concession for a new line, the Portuguese parliament approved an additional 
clause stating that Portuguese citizens should occupy the majority of seats on the 
board of directors. By 1887 the bylaws review had removed all powers assigned to 
the Paris committee and shifted managerial control to the Board in Lisbon. This led 
Paris to appoint a General Inspector of operations in Lisbon to oversee operations. 
The off-shoring of management activities in France, with the majority shareholders 
in Spain and the legal headquarters in Portugal, was a way to access management 
skills vital to railway construction and operation not available on site in Portugal 
(Silva, 2014).   
 
From the historical examples provided above for alternatives of organizational 
designs of headquarters, one can see that, on the one hand, legal headquarters tend 
to be detached when investments take place in high-risk markets and firms need to 
safeguard their survival. On the other hand, financial detachment is explained by the 
need for entrepreneurs to internalize capital markets. Finally strategic detachment 
tends to take place when it improves the efficiencies in terms of flows of goods and 
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knowledge. Firms often tend to choose markets where they can be embedded in 
networks and value chains that are strategic for the activities of firms. In most cases, 
it is efficiency considerations that dictate the particular geographic distribution of 
headquarter roles. However, in some circumstances that is not the case. As 
discussed by Cyert and March (1963), Aharoni (1966), Boddewyn (1983), Aharoni et 
al (2011), and Vahlne and Johanson (2014), among others, foreign investment 
decisions are a complicated social process. Organizational behaviour, and personal 
preferences of entrepreneurs and other behavioral variables, such as social 
networks, can also be alternative rationales for internationalization. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This research note has explored how historical evidence can challenge a common 
misperception about internalization theory. International business history provides 
many rich and informative examples of firms that appear to have adopted 
organizational forms viewed as innovative and unconventional today, but that were 
quite common in earlier historical eras. Entrepreneurs, in most cases, acted quite 
rationally at the time that they operated, aiming to maximize efficiencies such as 
those associated with access to more efficient capital markets and safer institutional 
legal systems, and the ability to take timely decisions adapted to local environments. 
Entrepreneurs also aimed to minimize risks and maximize the chances of growth and 
survival of their business. Some of these firms with unconventional organizational 
forms and multinational activity evolved into modern MNEs by adapting their 
organizational strategies and structures to changing circumstances, while other ones 
did not survive or were merged or acquired.  
 
The modern MNE did not develop down a linear path from a smaller and simpler 
version of itself. When confronted with new or unexpected imperfections in 
markets, the MNE does not necessarily change the mode of entry from markets (or 
hybrid modes such as joint ventures) to hierarchies, or from hierarchies to markets 
(or to any hybrid mode). Instead, the MNE can choose to keep the same mode of 
entry and either change the design of its headquarters by distributing all or part of 
the headquarters functions (legal, financial or strategic) across different markets, or 
can change the type and role of the entrepreneur used to provide or source local 
knowledge in the host country (from a local manager, to an expatriate entrepreneur 
or a ‘secondee’).  In some cases, the MNE changes both the design of the 
headquarters and the type of entrepreneur sourcing local knowledge. 
 
Nineteenth-century MNEs had to address problems of slow communications and 
high risk. They needed to devolve power to foreign subsidiaries or affiliated firms, 
which could then respond to local problems in a more timely fashion, using local 
knowledge. For this purpose, they needed local entrepreneurs, and expatriates were 
considered very suitable. The flexibility of early MNEs was achieved partly by 
adopting what would be called today a ‘network structure‘ or  ‘heterarchy’, in which 
headquarters confined themselves to legal or financial roles, and gave subsidiaries 
considerable strategic autonomy. 
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It looks likely that some of these apparently innovative and unconventional, but 
highly flexible organizational forms may re-emerge in the twenty-first century as a 
response to increasing and different types of risks - legal (eg. taxation), political (eg. 
war, terrorism, nationalism, and populism), and economic and business risks (eg. 
trade protectionism and weak protection of intellectual property rights), and climatic 
(eg. floods and tornados). While local entrepreneurship provides flexibility in the 
host country, it is likely that corporate headquarters will need to become more 
flexible too. ‘Unbundling’ or distributing headquarters activities is already quite 
common. It often carries negative connotations in popular discourse, e.g., the 
phenomena of offshore tax havens and the concentration of financial capital in 
‘global cities’. However, there is a positive side to headquarters activity unbundling. 
Business history analysis of these risks, and more broadly, of elements of 
institutional quality, are critical to explaining MNE choices of entrepreneurial roles in 
the host country and the distribution of headquarter roles.  
 
The proposed extension to internalization theory takes into account different 
imperfections in markets, but considers a variety of strategic and managerial issues.  
It supports, therefore, Verbeke and Kano’s (2015) argument that internalization 
theory can be enriched through “the infusion of a substantial business history 
perspective.” However, while proposed extensions have tended to focus on the 
management of the innovation process (Rugman et al, 2011; Verbeke, 2009; 
Verbeke and Kano, 2012), here we propose that internalization theory needs to take 
into account different configurations of particular entrepreneurial roles in foreign 
operations, and also organizational designs and distribution of headquarters’ roles. 
These patterns emerge clearly from deep engagement with historical evidence.  
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